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RECENT CASE NOTES
refrains from seeking insurance elsewhere in justifiable reliance on the
prompt consideration of his application. The main element, however, seems
to be that the company accepted a charter to engage in a business affected
with a public interest. To permit the company to avoid the duty to act
promptly by inducing the appellant not to pay the premium in advance, is
to permit fraud, not only against the applicant, but also against the state
which granted it permission to engage in business within the state. Furthermore the company, if the insurance is effected, receives compensation
for a risk it did not assume, namely the interim between the application
and the attachment of liability which is stipulated to be after delivery of
the policy and the payment of the first premium, and under the rule announced in this case, is permitted to increase that period at will.
The basis for liability should not depend on the payment of the premium
in advance. The business of insurance is a public calling, and therefore
subject to regulation. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389.
This regulation has been permitted even to the extent of limiting the rates
and also the compensation of agents. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 51 Sup. Ct. R. 130. This is additional proof that the insurance
business is a public calling, as the Supreme Court of United States has
declared that rates cannot be regulated outside of public callings. Williams
v. Standard Oil, 49 Sup. Ct. 115, 278 U. S. 235. Since it is a public calling,
the public calling duties should attach. Among these are the duties to
furnish reasonably adequate facilities, and to act with due diligence. Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio State R. 301. Thus such delay as was present in this case would be a violation of a public calling duty, and would
give rise to a cause of action for the loss occasioned thereby. Such duty
being imposed, the company should not be able to avoid its liability by
inducing the non-payment of the premium until after the delivery of the
policy, but should be liable in all events for negligent delay resulting in
loss to the applicant, a much more desirable result in view of its public
calling character.
H. N. F.
WILLS-LATENT AMBIGUITY-INTENTION OF TEsTAToR-One W. R. Meredith died leaving a will setting out the following items: "The balance of
my property of every kind, character, and description, real and personal,
I will and bequeath in fee simple to my first and my second cousins living
at my death... ." There are 15 first cousins and 136 second cousins and
according to ancestry they were divided into five groups. The plaintiff, in
a suit to partition the property, attacked the will, contending that the testator meant only the first and second cousins of the Meredith group. The
lower court heard testimony concerning the testator's intention but held
against plaintiff because there was no ambiguity on the face of the will.
Held, affirmed. There were parties fulfilling the description of the beneficiaries both at the time of making and death; and there is no ambiguity in
the will. Parol evidence to vary the express language of a will is inadmissible. Rodarrnel v. Gwinnup. Appellate Court of Indiana, 1930, 173 N. E.
327.
On the principal point the decision is easily sustained. There was no
ambiguity, either latent or patent. The words used had a clear and definite
meaning, and actually referred to individuals who could be identified with-
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out trouble from the language used. What is really involved here is the
parol evidence rule. The statute on wills requires that a testamentary disposition of property be made only in a written instrument, executed with
certain formalities. Burns 3452 (1926). To allow a disposition of the
property in a manner contrary to the expressed intention of the testator as
evidenced by his written will, is to give effect to an oral testamentary disposition of property. This, the statute of wills and the parol evidence rule
prohibit. Vestal v. Garret, 197 Ill. 398, 64 N. E. 345; Pata v. Bushong, 161
Ind. 533, 69 N. E. 291; Grimes' Executors v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 254;
Judy v. Gilbert, 77 Ind. 96, 98; Sturgis v. Work, 122 Ind. 134; McAlister v.
Butterfield, 31 Ind. 25, 28; Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 128 Ind. 93; and Pate v.
Bushong, 161 Ind. 532, 69 N. E. 291, where the wills were held to be ambiguous and subject to parol evidence.
It will be noticed that in this case the will was attacked in an action for
the partition of the property. It is suggested that it might have been successfully attacked in an action to contest the will. The contention of the
plaintiffs here really was that a part of the will was induced or executed
by. mistake and not that the language used was ambiguous. The distinction
is between inadequately expressing an intention, and in not intending what
was plainly expressed. If it is the latter, and the reason inducing the use
of the language was some mistake on the part of the testator, then the
fact of mistake may become immaterial. That is, mistake if it is material
goes to the animus testandi, just as does fraud or undue influence. The
result is that the part of the will induced or executed by mistake is not an
expression of a testamentary intention by the testator. In other words, the
intention to make a will must be one which is uninfluenced by fraud, undue
influence, or mistake. Originally courts refused to recognize the fact of
mistake in the inducement as going to the animus testandi; Iddings v.
Iddings, (Penn.) 7 Serg. & R., III; Mitchell v. Gard, 3 Sev. & Tr. 75; Shadbolt v. Waugh, 3 Hagg, 573; Barker v. Somins, 110 Mass. 477. 488, 489,
although it was always the law that a mistake in the execution destroyed
the. animus testandi. In Re Meyers' Estate, Pro. Div. (1908) 353; In Re
Goods of Hunt, L. R. 3 P. & D. 250 (1875); Nelson v. McDonald, 61 Hun.
406, 16 N. Y. S. 273; Hildreth v. Marshall, 51 N. J. Eq. 241, 27 Atl. 465.
In more recent years a mistake which actually induces a testamentary
disposition of the property has been held to destroy the animus testandi.
Earlier English cases allowed evidence of mistake in the inducement only
if it was proved that the testator had not read the will; and then only if
the mistake could be corrected by striking out a part of the will. Hdrter
v. Harter (1873) L. R., 3 P. D. 11; In Re Goods of Boehm, Pro. Div. (1897)
247; In Re Goods of Bushel, 13 P. & D. 7 (1887).
But the first requirement has now been abandoned in England, and evidence of mistake may be received even though the testator has read the
will. Morrel v. Morrel, Pro. Div. 7 P. & D. 68, (1882). In this country the
courts have usually not made that distinction as is shown by the leading
case of Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 210, 6 Sup. Ct. 617, 20 L. Ed. 860. And
apparently they have not limited the doctrine to the remedy of striking out.
Bohler v. Hicks, 120 Ga. 800, 48 S. E. 306, Grimes Exec. v. Harmon, 35 Ind.
198, 254. The law of mistake in the inducement of a will is in some confusion, but the tendency seems to be to give it the same latitude as is givp'
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in the law of contracts. The remedy, of course, is different. A contract
may be reformed for mistake; but a court of equity can not reform a will.
Dennis v. Holsapple, 148 Ind. 207, 47 N. E. 631; Sherwood v. Sherwood, 45
Wisc. 357; Barnes v. Bartlett, 47 Ind. 98. But a will may be contested on
the grounds of mistake. Section 3485 Burns, 1926. From the rule of interpretation stated in Kenworth v. Williaims, 5 Ind. 375, mistake comes
within the contemplation of the statute.
In the instant case the question could not be raised in the partition suit.
The will had been probated, and until set aside in whole or in part by an
action to contest, it stood as the testamentary disposition of the testator's
property, and the decree admitting the will to probate would be res judicata
on the point. Jones v. Rhodes, 74 Ind. 510; Stocky v. Watkins, 112 Ga. 268;
Winslow v. Donnely, 119 Ind. 565, 22 N. E. 13; Van Savingham v. Hartman, 77 Ind. App. 474, 130 N. E. 138; In Re Pearson'sEstate, 196 Cal. 294,
237 Pac. 744. In Re Davis' Estate, 151 Cal. 319, 86 Pac. 183, 90 Pac. 711,
is a case squarely in point as to the facts and the holding upon the point
above raised. But an action to contest would be a direct attack. Whether
it would have been effective in the instant case, would depend on the exact
contention of the Plaintiff, and as to how far the courts in Indiana are going to go in the matter of mistake. If for example the contention had been
that "second cousins" had been included by mistake, and that the testator
intended only the first cousins to take, although there is apparently no Indiana case directly deciding the point, there is abundant authority in other
jurisdictions for a successful contest of the will as to the phrase "second
cousins" for the purpose of striking it out.
If the contention were that the testator really intended that only certain
groups of his second cousins should take, and that by mistake he included
all, the situation is more difficult. It has been met, however, by striking out
the word "second," and then allowing parol evidence to explain the resulting ambiguity of "
Cousins." Patch v. White, supra, is followed by
most jurisdictions upon this point. The explanation of the ambiguity could
be made in a subsequent partition suit, and certainly could be made in an
action brought for a construction of the will. In fact, however, the Indiana
Court has on at least one occasion reached this result by calling a description ambiguous which was not ambiguous. See, Pate v. Bushong, 161 Ind.
532, 69 N. E. 291.
J. B. E.

